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Legal Malpractice Cases: Special
Problems in Identifying Issues of Law
and Fact and in the Use of Expert
Testimony
By CHARms M. LEIBSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal malpractice litigation in the United States has increased
dramatically in recent years.' This Article surveys two kinds of
legal malpractice cases, suits by former clients charging negli-
gence in prior litigation and countersuits by former defendants
who are usually, but not necessarily, physicians charging that
the prior law suit damaged their reputations. In these cases,
courts experience special difficulty in two areas: (1) defining the
proper decision making roles of the judge and jury, and (2)
deciding the appropriate role for expert testimony. This Article
examines these problems and suggests possible solutions, with
particular emphasis on Kentucky law. Two recent Kentucky cases,2
which will be discussed in detail, illustrate the extent of confu-
sion in this area.
An attorney's former client's cause of action for litigation
negligence involves the same elements essential to every negli-
gence case: duty, breach of duty, causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury, and actual loss or damage
* Justice, Kentucky Supreme Court. This article was submitted to comply with
the writing requirement in the University of Virginia Master of Law Degree Program.
It was written as a student, not as a judge, and expresses no opinion or commitment in
the decision of any future cases.
I R. MALLEN AND V. LEvnT, LEGAL MALPRACTIcE § 6 (2d ed. 1981). Although
only rudimentary statistics were available in 1981, Mallen and Levit provide evidence of
a "dramatic and steady increase in the frequency of legal malpractice litigation" since
the 1960's. The authors hypothesize that this trend has not yet peaked. Id. at 14.
z See Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) discussed at note
65-69 infra and accompanying text; Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981), discussed
at notes 180-204 infra and accompanying text.
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sustained.3 However, unlike litigation negligence cases, counter-
suits by physicians against their patient's attorney are not
grounded in negligence. The reason is that, when suing the
physician, the patient and his attorney owe no duty of reasonable
care to the physician.4 Instead, such countersuits are grounded
on a concept loosely labeled "malicious prosecution." Strictly
speaking, this is a term limited to wrongful prosecution of
criminal cases,5 and, therefore, calling a physician's countersuit
a "malicious prosecution" action is "something of a misno-
mer." 6 They are more properly described as "wrongful civil pro-
ceedings."
7
These two types of legal malpractice cases, litigation negli-
gence and countersuits based upon wrongful civil proceedings,
involve certain common, complicated and interrelated problems.
A nationwide survey reveals five common problems central to
the confusion:
(1) Which issues should the court decide and which issues
should the jury decide?
(2) Which issues should be addressed by expert testimony
and which should not?
(3) How should jury instructions be framed to leave factual
questions to the jury and legal questions to the court?
(4) Upon appeal, which issues should be reviewed as factual
determinations and which as legal determinations?
(5) What are the similarities and dissimilarities between cases
of litigation negligence and countersuits?
PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 163, 168 (5th ed. 1984).
4 Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). In Hill, the plaintiff/
physician filed suit against his patient's attorney after winning a summary judgment in
a malpractice action. The physician asserted that the attorney owed the physician a duty
to act in accordance with general principles of the ABA's Code of Professional Respon-
sibilities. The court held, however, that the duty the Code sets forth "establishes the
minimum level of competence for the protection of the public and a violation thereof
does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action." Id. at 334.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 653-73 (1977).
6 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, at 892. Prosser and Keeton suggest the use
of the word "prosecution" is inappropriate because countersuits are civil, rather than
criminal proceedings. Furthermore, there may be subtle differences in the burdens of
proof. Id.
I Id. at 889-96.
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A. Overview of Litigation Negligence Cases
1. Allocation of Issues
The judicial decision of which issues presented in a case
should be treated as factual issues for the jury to decide and
which as legal issues for the court to decide is crucial to the
development of tort law.8 The more the interpretive function of
the decision making process is left to the jury, the greater the
potential scope and application of such concepts as reasonable
conduct, negligence and gross negligence. To the extent the role
of the jury is limited, the concepts involved are limited in scope
and controlled by the policies of the court.9 Thus, deciding which
issues are questions of law and which are questions of fact
becomes an important tool of judicial policy making, bearing
consequences in expanding or narrowing potential liability.
In litigation negligence cases, questions of law and fact be-
come confused. What were questions of law in the underlying
action sometimes emerge as issues of fact in the subsequent
litigation negligence case. This Article suggests that the law is
best served in a litigation negligence case when the trial judge
and the jury each decide those issues they would have decided
at the trial of the underlying action. This test of allocation,
although somewhat different from the traditional "facts vs. law"
test, is easier for the trial court to apply, is clearer and more
specific, and will result in greater uniformity.
I As one Kentucky opinion explained:
The more judges take cases [and issues] away from juries, the more the
concepts of reasonable conduct, negligence and gross negligence become
synonymous with the view of the judge or judges on that court. Likewise,
the more the interpretative power is delegated to juries, the more these
concepts become the aggregate of discrete findings by juries.
Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Ky. 1985).
" L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 268, 386-91 (1930). Green contends that courts
have developed more control over jury discretion in negligence cases than any other
type. Through use of any number of "subtle doctrines," judges basically declare "rights
and duties-in other words, indicating the boundaries of legal rules, or the harms against
which government will undertake to give protection of some sort." Id. at 386.
1986-87]
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2. The Role of Expert Testimony
The function of an expert witness is to provide specialized
knowledge to assist the jury in understanding a factual issue
which it must decide. In litigation negligence cases, because many
courts have failed to allocate properly those issues that should
be decided by the court or the jury, these courts have likewise
failed to properly utilize and control the use of expert testimony.
The role of the expert witness in a litigation negligence action
should be limited to presenting evidence relating to the defendant
attorney's conduct; did the attorney's conduct conform to the
legal standard required under the circumstances? No expert tes-
timony should be permitted on the legal consequences that would
have followed had the attorney performed properly in the prior
case, because this is either (1) an issue for the court (not the
jury) to decide, or (2) an issue of ultimate fact for the jury
which should not be preempted by the conclusions of experts.
This rule achieves at least two desirable goals. First, it re-
duces the number of times an expert invades the province of the
jury. Second, it eliminates the possibility that a jury will accept
an expert witness' view of the law instead of the trial judge's
view as set forth in the court's instructions to the jury.
B. Overview of Countersuits
The second type of attorney malpractice case that this Article
considers is the countersuit based upon malicious prosecution,
or more accurately, upon wrongful civil proceedings. This type
of countersuit is a tort in transition, surrounded by confusion.
The primary areas of confusion are:
(1) What constitutes probable cause;
(2) What are the proper roles of the judge and jury in
determining the existence of probable cause; and
(3) What is the proper role of expert witness testimony.
Many decisions that will be reviewed in this Article blur the
distinction between wrongful civil proceedings and litigation neg-
ligence. This author concludes: (1) that the Restatement (Second)
of Torts0 sets forth the appropriate elements of the tort: a lack
SRESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674-76 (1977).
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of reasonable belief (probable cause to believe) that the claim is
valid and an improper purpose, and (2) that the initial decision
of whether or not there was probable cause to initiate the un-
derlying action should be decided by the court. If the court
decides there was probable cause to initiate or continue the prior
case, a directed verdict should be granted to the defendant/
attorney. If the court decides there was no probable cause, the
jury should then be allowed to determine the issue of whether
the attorney's conduct was wrongful. In determining this issue,
the jury should be instructed to decide whether the attorney's
conduct was wrongful in accordance with his professional obli-
gations, as expressed through the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, and not along the lines of a negligence case.
If the jury's role is limited to determining conflicts in the
underlying facts and deciding whether an attorney's conduct was
wrongful, there should be little need for expert testimony in a
wrongful civil proceedings case.
This approach will lead to greater uniformity and clarity in
decisions, reduce or eliminate the need for expert testimony, and
enhance judicial economy in both time and costs.
II. LITIGATION NEGLIGENCE CASES
A. Judge vs. Jury Questions
In a litigation negligence case a client sues his former attor-
ney claiming he was damaged by his attorney's negligence in
handling the client's previous case. The principal cause of con-
fusion in these cases is in understanding the role of the so-called
"case within a case." This means, in effect, that there are now
two separate and distinct suits to be tried in the same action."
At the outset, the court must realize that there are two
separate cases being tried in one action. To properly adjudicate
" D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTIcE LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3:5 (1980).
One suit is against the attorney who represented the plaintiff in the under-
lying action. The other suit is theoretically against the original defendant
since the success of that action is required in order to establish the attor-
ney's error and its resultant harm. The plaintiff in the legal malpractice
1986-87]
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the matter, the court must parse the factual from the legal issues
in each. Before instructing the jury the court must identify all
of the questions of law in both cases. The jury instructions
should separate the underlying factual issues in the previous case
from the factual issues in the legal malpractice case. The reso-
lution of the factual questions in the underlying case sometimes
leaves only a question of law for the court to decide in the
litigation negligence case. On the other hand, sometimes deciding
the legal issues in the second case makes the question of fact in
the underlying case moot.
Contrasting results in two Oregon cases illustrate the prob-
lem. In Shields v. Campbell,'2 the client charged his former
attorney with losing a declaratory judgment action by negligently
failing to introduce certain documents as evidence.' 3 Both sides
offered expert testimony on what legal effect the omitted docu-
ments would have had on the outcome of the declaratory judg-
ment action.' 4 The opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court states,
"we know of no other way in which the jury could have been
guided in determining the issue."'' 5 The court failed to recognize
that the legal effect of the omitted documents was not a jury
issue. The court should have differentiated between the issue of
negligence in failing to file the documents and the issue of the
legal effect of the omitted documents. If, as a matter of law,
the former client would have prevailed had the documents been
filed, the only fact issue was whether the attorney negligently
failed to file them.
In Shields, the fact that the previous case was a declaratory
judgment action compounded the problem. Because the previous
case was tried without a jury, the distinction between factual
suit must show that he would have won the underlying suit (the case within
a case) before he can succeed against the attorney.
Id. See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, at 892-96.
12 559 P.2d 1275 (Or. 1977).
" Id.
I d. at 1278. The plaintiff's expert testified that an attorney exercising reasonable
care and skill would have offered the documents. The defendant's witnesses primarily
focused on the state of the law at the time of the earlier trial to convince the jury that
failure to introduce the documents was merely a mistake in judgment. Id. at 1278-79.
" Id. at 1280.
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and legal issues was not clearly drawn, a complication present
in many instances when the "case within the case" is an equity
or non-jury case. The ruling in Shields erroneously permitted
the expert witnesses to testify concerning, and the jury to decide,
not only the factual question of negligence but also the legal
implications of the omitted evidence.
In a less complicated case, Chocktoot v. Smith, 6 the same
Oregon Supreme Court achieved a far more satisfactory result.
Here, the defendant/attorney lost a case in which the plaintiff, who
was the personal representative of a decedent, prior to decedents
death sought to prove parentage and inherit as an heir from his
pre-deceased father. The attorney negligently failed to discover
and present certain material evidence and also failed to appeal
the adverse decision. 7 The court saw the issue clearly: "Who,
judge or jury, must decide whether an attorney's negligence
harmed his client, and upon what evidence, when the negligence
concerned an issue decided by a court rather than a jury?"1 8
The court distinguished its previous decision in Shields 9 by
pointing out that in Shields "both sides called upon lawyers for
opinion evidence bearing both on the issue of professional neg-
ligence and the issue of causation [legal consequences] without
differentiating between these or between questions of fact or of
law." 20 The court stated:
But when the issue is squarely presented, this undifferentiated
treatment of the several questions does not withstand closer
examination. There are significant differences between the
question of negligence and that of its probable consequences,
and also between the probable decisions of a dispute of fact
and of a dispute of law if the negligence had not occurred.2
The opinion recognizes that "[u]nlike its decision of a dis-
puted issue of the professional standard of care, the jury cannot
571 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1977).
' Id. at 1256.
'I Id.
See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
571 P.2d at 1257.
Id. at 1257-58.
1986-87]
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decide a disputed issue of law on the testimony of lawyers."
22
The court concluded that:
If the trial judge is persuaded that the earlier court would
properly have ruled favorably upon the legal step omitted by
the malpractice defendant, it is his task in a jury trial to explain
the effect that this favorable ruling would have had on plain-
tiff's case. If a ruling would have conclusively established
plaintiff's victory in the earlier litigation, or if plaintiff could
not have prevailed even with a favorable ruling on a particular
point, then this explanation of the law in the malpractice action
may have the effect of any directed verdict. But in other cases,
explanation of the legal ruling alone will not conclusively de-
termine the causation of plaintiff's loss, which will remain for
the jury to decide.
We conclude, in short, that in determining the probable con-
sequences of an attorney's earlier negligence in a later action for
malpractice, the line dividing the responsibility of judge and jury
runs between questions of law and questions of fact.
23
The Oregon court's analysis of this point is sound, but its
subsequent conclusion that the jury at the next trial should
decide those issues of fact that were properly addressed to a
judge sitting without a jury in a declaratory judgment is not. A
declaratory judgment action is a non-jury trial and involves the
trial court in findings of fact as well as conclusions of law. The
Chocktoot court concluded that "there is no reason why the
jury cannot replicate the judgment of another factfinding tri-
bunal. ' 24 Actually, there are sound legal reasons why certain
cases are tried, and tried better, without a jury.25 Matters which
would be decided by a judge without a jury at the prior trial,
1 Id. at 1258.
I ld. at 1259.
' Id.
-' See Sower, "Complicated Issues" v. The Right to a Jury Trial: A Procedural
Remnant in Kentucky Law Raises Constitutional Problems, 3 N. Ky. L. REV. 173 (1975-
76) (some issues justify civil trial without a jury); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in
Complex Litigation, 92 HARv. L. REV. 898, 918 (1978-79) ("When confronted with a
suit too complex to be decided by a jury, a court has the power and obligation to
declare particular issues equitable and go beyond the scope of the Seventh Amend-
ment.").
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whether by findings of fact or conclusions of law, are more
efficiently decided by the judge rather than the jury when legal
malpractice cases are tried.
26
A recurring problem in litigation negligence cases is whether
the causation issue requires reconstructing the probable behavior
of the factfinder in the original trial. Should jurors from the
first trial be brought into court to be examined on the effect the
omitted evidence would have had on their decision? Should
expert testimony about the characteristics of the previous judge
and jurors be allowed into evidence? Shotild there be testimony
from the previous judge as to what he would have done had the
omitted evidence been offered? In Chocktoot, the court con-
cluded that in the second trial the second jury should be "per-
mitted to decide ... by substituting its own judgment for that
of the factfinder in the earlier case." 27 The question is whether
the jury at the second trial should decide what the first jury
would have done if the case had been properly tried, or simply
what the first jury should have done.
To help the jury decide what the first jury would have done,
the court in Duncan v. Lord2" permitted the plaintiff's expert
witness to present a detailed analysis of the type of jury to
whom the original case probably would have been presented. 29
This case "illustrate[s] the absurd results to which a legal mal-
practice trial may lead when the jury is required to determine
what the jury in the original trial would have done."30 As one
author notes: "The notion that a jury can determine the verdict
an earlier jury would have rendered by considering psychological
and other data on the first jury is at best debatable."
' 31
See notes 27-77 infra and accompanying text.
" 571 P.2d at 1258. The court noted: "Once it is accepted that this is what the
malpractice jury does, there is no reason why the jury (or a court when sitting without
a jury) should not do the same even when the earlier [factfinder] was a judge, an
administrative hearings officer, an arbitrator, a court-martial, or any tribunal deciding
on factual grounds." Id.
21 409 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (malpractice suit founded upon a nol
pros entered against the plaintiff in the first suit "for persistent failure to answer
interrogatories").
"I Id. at 693.
-J See Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Litigation Attorneys,
14 WILLAMEmr L.J. 425, 439 (1977-78).
,1 Id. at 440.
1986-871
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Thus, in a malpractice action founded upon claims of negli-
gent preparation or conduct of litigation, the question whether
the conduct was improper is an issue of fact for the jury. The
critical decision for the court is whether the consequences of the
allegedly negligent conduct call for a decision by the court on a
question of law or call for a decision by the jury on a question
of fact. The cases below illustrate the difference.
In an interesting case growing out of the Watergate conspir-
acy trials, James W. McCord, Jr. sued his former counsel,
including the well-known attorney, F. Lee Bailey, charging that
counsel "negligently failed to argue a defense of 'official au-
thorization' for the now famous Watergate break-in and thereby
denied McCord a successful defense."'3 2 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia granted the defendant/attorney a
summary judgment, concluding that if such a defense had been
raised at McCord's trial, "Judge Sirica would have stricken it
on its face; there could have been no difference in the trial's
outcome. ' 3  Thus, when the question of negligence is severed
from the question of consequences, the question of negligence
becomes moot when no legal consequences result.
In Martin v. Hall,34 the attorney was charged with negligently
failing to raise a double jeopardy defense. The California ap-
pellate court held that, although negligence was a jury question,
the trial court "should have ruled how the court in the criminal
case would have resolved these legal questions. "'a The court
stated:
If, after the establishment of the basic facts, it became evident
that, as a matter of law, a particular defense could not have
prevailed, any evidence on whether or not defendant commit-
ted malpractice in not raising it became academic .... [U]nder
the peculiar facts of this case, the question of causation was
one of law.
36
1. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
983 (1981). The "official authorization" defense was premised upon the defendant's
belief "that the Attorney General of the United States had authorized and approved the
activity ... [making) ... lawful what would otherwise have been unlawful behavior."
Id.
Id. at 612.
97 Cal. Rptr. 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
Id. at 733.
Id. at 733-34.
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The plaintiff in Stafford v. Garretta7 won a libel judgment,
but the trial court granted the defendant a new trial on unspec-
ified grounds. The plaintiff's attorney then advised a compro-
mise settlement.3 8 In the litigation negligence action which
followed, the former client claimed that his attorney negligently
advised him to compromise instead of pursuing an appeal to
reinstate the libel judgment. The appellate court held that, al-
though the question whether the attorney's advice was reasonable
was one of fact, the question whether the plaintiff would have
prevailed on an appeal of the libel case was one of law. a9 The
Oregon court, looking beyond the question of the attorney's
negligence, concluded that the second suit was dismissed properly
because the judge's ruling in the first case would have been
sustained on appeal. 40 Thus, as a matter of law the plaintiff
sustained no damages from the advice to accept a compromise
settlement of the previous case because he would not have pre-
vailed on appeal.
The former client in Schenkel v. Monheit4l charged his at-
torney with negligence in handling his personal injury claim
alleging that the attorney's failure to join the defendant's cor-
porate employer resulted in an inadequate verdict.4 2 The appel-
late court affirmed a summary judgment for the attorney,
reasoning that because the jury in the first case did not know
the extent of the defendant's insurance coverage, it was specu-
lative whether the jury would have granted a larger award had
counsel joined the corporate employer 3.4  The case against the
attorney failed for lack of proof of any legal consequences from
the attorney's alleged negligence.
" 613 P.2d 99 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
" Although the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
absolute privilege grounds was denied, the plaintiff's attorney feared a successful cross-
appeal. Id. at 100-01.
I d. at 101.
Id. at 103.
4 405 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
, To support his allegation, the plaintiff showed that at a conference, the judge
estimated that the case had a settlement value of $75,000, and the defendant's counsel
suggested $25,000 as a settlement. The jury awarded the plaintiff only $9,500. Id.
' The court reasoned that "[t]he tort was the same in this case, whether or not
the corporate employer was a party to the action." Id. at 494.
1986-87]
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Woodruff v. Tomlin," presents a good comparison to the
Schenkel case. In Woodruff, the plaintiff charged that the for-
mer counsel was negligent in representing the plaintiff, a guest
passenger, and her host driver, and then pursuing the plaintiff's
claim only against the other vehicle's driver when there was
evidence both drivers were at fault. The first trial's finding that
the plaintiff's host driver was solely at fault was affirmed on
appeal. Thus the guest passenger made no recovery.
45
In the attorney's malpractice case, the trial court found as a
matter of law that it would be speculation for a jury to conclude
that the attorney's multiple representation affected the outcome
of the previous case.46 The appellate court reversed because the
question was not whether the outcome of the first trial would
have been different but whether plaintiff "lost the opportunity
for a recovery based on the negligence of [her host driver].
' 47
A former attorney in Croce v. Sanchez4 8 was charged with
negligence for failing to perfect an appeal. The appellate court
held that the question of causation was a "legal issue," and that
the legal malpractice suit was properly dismissed because there
was no error to cause a reversal had the first appeal been
perfected. 49 The trial court in the litigation negligence case prop-
erly disposed of the case within a case, the failed appeal, as a
question of law, by standing in the shoes of the appellate court
and deciding what would have happened on the first appeal.
An interesting Kentucky case wrestling with the question of
a failed appeal is Auxier v. Murrell" where the trial court dis-
missed a litigation negligence case, holding that there existed
"no basis on which the Court of Appeals could or would set
aside [the prior adverse] judgment."'" The plaintiff contended
that the question of whether the prior case would have been
reversed with a perfected appeal should have been decided in
616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980).
" Id. at 927-28.
1 Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 593
F.2d 33 (6th Cir. Tenn., 1979).
17 616 F.2d at 936.
1 64 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 927 (1968).
49 Id. at 450.
No. 80-CA-2102-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1981) (unpublished).
Id., slip op. at 3.
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the second trial as a factual question, i.e., was it reasonably
probable that the first case would have been reversed had the
appeal been perfected? 2 The Kentucky Court of Appeals af-
firmed the dismissal, concluding that it made no difference if
the standard was whether the case "probably" would have been
reversed or whether it would in fact have been reversed.53 The
court reached the correct result without appearing to understand
the proper reason, which is: what would have occurred had the
first appeal been perfected was not a factual question, but a
legal question.
The Auxier court's opinion was based in part on Better
Homes, Inc. v. Rogers.4 In Better Homes, the court dismissed
a litigation negligence case concluding that even if the failure to
appeal deprived the plaintiff of a reasonable prospect of reversal,
the amount that could be obtained in the event of reversal was
"considerably less than the minimum" required for federal court
jurisdiction." The Better Homes' dicta presents the dilemma
facing the trial judge in a litigation negligence case when called
on to decide the likelihood of success of a prior appeal, had it
been perfected. The United States District Court for the North-
ern District of West Virginia, in disposing of this case by sum-
mary judgment on other grounds, stated that to make such a
decision "is appealing because it is repugnant to my sense of
judicial propriety that I should sit in lieu of [the appellate court]
of West Virginia, to pass judgment upon the propriety of the
rulings of the trial court [in the former action].
'"56
"Repugnant" or not, the trial court in a litigation negligence
suit must function as an appellate court when the issue of the
consequences of the alleged attorney's negligence is a purely
legal matter such as whether the former case would have been
reversed on appeal.
Thus, in a case founded upon alleged improper conduct of
prior litigation, the factual question that a prior jury would have
decided if the defendant/attorney had conducted a proper in-
Id., slip op. at 7.
'Id.
195 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. W.Va. 1961).
" Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
1986-87]
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vestigation, presentation, or exclusion of evidence, or other steps
bearing on a decision based on facts, is a question for the jury.5 7
But the question of what legal decision would have followed in
the earlier case if the defendant/attorney had taken proper steps
is a question of law for the court.
5 8
In Ishmael v. Millington5 9 the attorney represented both
husband and wife in an uncontested divorce proceeding. Subse-
quently the wife sued the attorney charging that she received an
inappropriate share of community assets. The court determined
that whether the attorney's conduct breached the duty of rea-
sonable care was a question of fact for the jury and that whether
the alleged breach caused damage (causation in fact) was likewise
a fact question unless there were legal reasons to decide the issue
one way or the other ° In Ishmael, the contested issue of fact
concerning causation centered on whether the former husband
or the attorney was instrumental in causing the wife to make an
inappropriate divorce settlement. In such circumstances
"[c]ausation was a jury issue which could not be resolved as a
matter of law. '
6'
Fuschetti v. Bierman62 illustrates a court properly parsing the
legal from the factual issues. The client claimed the attorney
negligently failed to file a damage suit before the expiration of
the statute of limitations. The unexplained failure to file a law
suit within the period of limitations may justify a directed verdict
against the attorney on the issue of negligence. In Fuschetti,
however, the defendant/attorney made this a factual question
for the jury by producing evidence that he timely notified his
client that he had withdrawn from the case. The question of the
probable consequences of such negligence, if any, likewise raised
factual questions on the issues of liability and damages in the
underlying case within a case. The New Jersey court ordered a
11 7 AM. JUR. 2D, Attorneys at Law § 224 (1980).
39 Id.
50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
W Id. at 595. See also Wilkinson v. Rives, 172 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(issue of attorney malpractice is essentially a factual question); Lipscomb v. Krause, 151
Cal. Rptr. 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (whether legal malpractice occurred is question for
jury).
. 50 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
- 319 A.2d 781 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
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bifurcated trial in which the attorney's negligence would first be
decided and then, if necessary, the jury would decide the out-
come of the prior claim.
63
On the question of whether the jury should decide the case
within a case on the basis of what the jury would have decided
in the prior case had it been timely filed, or on what it should
have decided on the basis of the evidence related to liability and
damages, the court stated: "While, in theory, the present jury
should determine what an earlier jury would have done, as a
practical matter the trial cannot be so conducted. All issues
touching upon plaintiff's personal injury action will be submitted
to the jury as matters of first impression.'' 64
A Kentucky case, Daugherty v. Runner,65 has a fact situ-
ation similar to the Fuschetti case, but with a dramatically
different course of litigation. In Daugherty, a former client
charged that his attorney was negligent in failing to file a medical
negligence suit within the period of limitations. However, the
attorney claimed that he was employed only to pursue an auto-
mobile accident claim, and thus never considered pursuing a
potential medical malpractice claim. Instead of bifurcating the
issues, as was done in the Fuschetti case, the trial court submitted
to the jury the questions of negligence in failing to file the
medical negligence claim; of whether such a claim would have
been successful; and, if so, what damages should have been
awarded. The jury, addressing the medical negligence issue as a
question of first impression, decided that the patient would have
recovered $146,123.75 from the physician, but also found that
there was no negligence on the part of the lawyer in failing to
timely file the medical malpractice action due to the circumstan-
ces of his employment.6
On appeal, the jury verdict for the defendant/attorney was
affirmed on the ground that, in view of the conflicting evidence
regarding the purpose for which the attorney was employed,
there was an issue of fact whether the attorney was negligent in
" Id. at 784.
- Id. at 785.
" 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
" Id. at 14.
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failing to file the medical negligence case. 67 Daugherty holds by
implication that the trial court properly submitted the "suit
within a suit"' ' 8 to the jury as an issue de novo, rather than an
issue to be decided by experts testifying as to what an earlier
jury would have done.6 9
The Daugherty opinion seems fundamentally sound, except
that judicial economy and conservation of resources would have
been well served if the factual issues had been bifurcated as in
the Fuschetti case. The issue of the attorney's negligence should
have been tried first, and then, if the plaintiff prevailed, the
issues raised in the underlying medical malpractice action should
have followed. The time and expense from trial of the medical
negligence case would thus have been avoided.
How should the court separate the function of court and
jury when the underlying case is a non-jury one? A Wisconsin
case, Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Insurance Co.,70 presents an inter-
esting contrast between the views expressed by the intermediate
appellate court and the supreme court. Helmbrecht charged her
former attorney with negligence in representing her in a divorce
action, first by falling to have the marital assets valued before
trial, and then in recommending a settlement that was inadequate
for maintenance and division of marital property. This settle-
ment was adopted by the divorce judge in the judgment. 7'
In the legal malpractice action that followed, a jury decided
what the divorce judge would have awarded in the former trial
if the attorney had properly tried the case. The intermediate
appellate court reversed for error in jury instructions. Then the
Supreme Court took discretionary review and also held that the
trial court's instructions were defective, but nevertheless affirmed
the jury's award, stating it was "supported by sufficient credible
evidence and would not have been different if the jury had been
thoroughly instructed. ' 72 The opinion states that the instructions
I Id. at 18 (conflicting evidence existed regarding whether medical malpractice suit
was discussed).
Id. at 13, 18.
Id. at 20.
1- 343 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 362 N.W.2d
118 (Wis. 1985).
343 N.W.2d at 135.
' 362 N.W.2d at 136.
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failed to adequately advise the jury on the "legal elements" that
a divorce judge must consider in making such an award: "At a
minimum, the jury instructions should have addressed what fac-
tors a court applies to its findings of fact in making its deter-
mination as to property division and maintenance.
' 73
It is unlikely that a jury could ever be adequately instructed
to determine an equitable matter of this nature because the jury
lacks sufficient training to function as an equity judge in the
first place. The reasons the constitutional right to trial by jury
in civil cases 74 does not apply to trial of certain issues are subjects
too broad to be included within the scope of this Article. Suffice
it to say that the type of issues historically included within
equitable jurisdiction, and now included in the expanded mean-
ing of non-jury jurisdiction, are so different in kind, and involve
so many variables in application, that jury and non-jury cases
are qualitatively different.75
The most significant judicial comment in the Helmbrecht
case is the argument for judicial determination of non-jury issues
made by Judge Cane76 of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in
his concurring opinion:
I am troubled by the opinion's assumption that the causal and
damage questions are jury determinations .... Generally, this
is not a problem because the outcome of the initial claim is
usually a factual question that can be resolved by a jury. Here,
however, the original claim arises from a divorce action where
the awards are judicial determinations, not factual determinations
permitted to be made by a jury. Spousal support, child support,
and property division are matters for the trial court's discretion.
Additionally, the court's award of maintenance, property
division, attorney fees, and children's medical expenses are in-
terrelated and interdependent. Maintenance orders are also sub-
ject to further order of the court....
. . . Yet we now require a jury in this type of attorney
malpractice action to arrive at a judicial determination on ques-
" Id. at 137.
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII; KY. CONST. § 7.
" See note 25 supra.
' The Hon. R. Thomas Cane, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, attended the U.
of Va. Master's Degree Program, 1984-86, with this article's author.
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tions of causation and damages that the jury would not be per-
mitted to make in a divorce action in the first instance. . . .I
would conclude that the underlying question of what a reasonable
judge would have awarded on the original claim should be for
the trial court to determine.
7
This author agrees with Judge Cane's approach, assigning
those issues which are judicial issues in the underlying case to
the court rather than to the jury at the subsequent trial of the
legal malpractice action, even though they are, technically speak-
ing, factual issues.
B. Expert Testimony in Litigation Negligence Cases
"Argument is argument whether in the box or at the bar, and
its proper place is the last.'" '78
This notable quote from Judge Learned Hand appears in
many subsequent cases, including Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club,
Inc. ,79 in which the court held it reversible error to permit expert
testimony on the legal obligations created by a contract for the
registration of stock. 0
Another author states:
[Ilt is not the jury's function to determine the law; the jury
thus has no need to hear conflicting testimony on the proper
interpretation of the law. In fact, such conflicting legal testi-
mony could be harmful: ... conflicting expert legal testimony
or any legal testimony [which is] not in conformity with the
judge's formulation of the law fails to meet the helpfulness
standard and should be excluded.8'
343 N.W.2d at 135-36 (citations omitted).
Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977). See also E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980) (if allowed to testify,
expert would be required to avoid usurping jury and court functions).
550 F.2d at 508.
Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HAxv. L. REV. 797, 811 (1984).
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The line that distinguishes between the proper and improper
use of expert testimony in an attorney's malpractice case should
be the same line which separates questions that should be decided
by the jury from those that should be decided by the court.
Non-jury issues should be matters of argument addressed to the
judge and not matters of proof. As one article explains:
Thus, the expert may testify only on issues of fact not within
the common experience of jurors, even though the expert may
be thoroughly versed in all legal questions before the court.
... The court decides the underlying legal issue of whether the
attorney had committed an error of law. It then is left to the jury
to determine the factual question of whether other attorneys
similarly situated would have made the same legal error.82
Yet the overuse of expert testimony, invading the province
of the court, is a prevalent feature of attorneys' malpractice
cases. For example, in Shields v. Campbell,83 both sides offered
expert testimony on the legal effect certain omitted documents
would have had on the outcome of the declaratory judgment
suit. The court stated, "we know of no other way in which the
jury could have been guided in determining the issue."' 84 This
approach overlooks the threshold question, which is whether the
jury should decide what a judge would have decided in the
earlier declaratory judgment action, a non-jury case. The dis-
tinction between factual issues and legal issues was never clearly
drawn.
Two years later, the Oregon court did a better job in Chock-
toot v. Smith85 by distinguishing between the use of expert
testimony to prove the attorney's negligence and its use to prove
the legal consequences that would have followed from proper
conduct. The court concluded that "[u]nlike [the jury's] decision
11 Breslin & McMonigle, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Attor-
neys, 47 INes. COUNs. J. 119, 123-24 (Jan. 1980).
559 P.2d 1275 (Or. 1977).
Id. at 1280.
' 571 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1979). Chocktoot v. Smith is the leading case showing the
importance of parsing the jury issues from the non-jury issues in an attorney's malprac-
tice case. For discussion, see notes 16-26 supra and accompanying text.
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of a disputed issue of the professional standard of care, the jury
cannot decide a disputed issue of law on the testimony of law-
yers." 6
The scope of permissible testimony by expert witnesses in
attorneys' malpractice cases is a debate not yet resolved by a
discernible trend in the decisions. 87 It is black letter law that
expert testimony is not permissible on issues of law.88 Neverthe-
less, experts are being permitted to testify about such questions. 89
Questions which are appropriate for expert testimony include
the acceptable conduct for an attorney in the preparation, trial
and appeal of litigation and whether the attorney's conduct
conformed to the legal standard of care. The legal impact of a
proper performance, however, is not appropriate for expert tes-
timony.
Negligence is an ultimate fact issue for the jury to determine.
Although Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 704 permits experts to
testify about "an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact," 9° Kentucky's rule is the more traditional and conservative
view that experts generally should not be so permitted, 9' because
to do so invades the province of the jury. Yet in attorneys'
malpractice cases, Kentucky goes to the opposite extreme, per-
mitting experts to testify not only about whether the attorney
was negligent but also about matters of legal causation. This
breakdown occurs because of the failure to differentiate between
the factual consequences and the legal consequences of the al-
legedly negligent act.
' Id. at 1258.
" Meiselman, The Expert Witness: A Vital Element of Legal Malpractice Suits,
17 TRIAL 39-41 (August 1981).
1 31 AM. Jui. 2D Expert in Opinion Evidence § 69 (1967); 32 C.J.S. Evidence
§ 453 (1964).
Mahaffey v. McMahon, 630 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1982) (expert would be allowed to
testify whether there had been probable cause for attorney to file medical malpractice
action against physician).
FED. R. EVID. 704 ("Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissable is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact.").
1' O'Connor & Raque Co. v. Bill, 474 S.W.2d 344 (Ky. 1971). See also Hampton
v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1984); Hargadon v. Louisville & N.R. Co.,
375 S.W.2d 834, 839 (Ky. 1964); Morton's Adm'r v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power
Co., 138 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky. 1940).
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As one author stated: "On the continuum between legal and
factual testimony, some testimony will come close to being purely
factual, whereas other testimony will be almost purely legal. As
a practical matter, however, distinguishing impermissible legal
testimony from permissible mixed testimony is often extremely
difficult. ' 92 "Difficult" or not, the distinction between permis-
sible and impermissible expert legal testimony is the key to
appropriate disposition of these cases.
Watkins v. Sheppard3 illustrates a "poorly-stated precedent
in this area."'94 In Watkins the defendant/attorney failed to file
a damage claim within the statute of limitations because he had
faulty information about the date of the accident. The critical
issue was the extent of the attorney's duty to investigate the
accident date. Although the attorney claimed that he asked his
client about the date of the accident at least forty times, the
court held that the defendant failed as a matter of law to
competently undertake his duty to investigate and file within the
statute of limitations, and that no expert testimony was needed
to establish his negligence. "The opinion neglected to explain
why forty requests for accurate information did not constitute
an 'investigation,' nor did it explain why an issue involving
competent accident investigation did ftot demand an expert wit-
ness." 95
The defendant/attorney in Wright v. Williams96 formerly
represented certain purchasers of a vessel. The attorney was
allegedly negligent for failing to inform his clients of the legal
effect of an endorsement in the title document which precluded
use of the vessel in coast-wide trade. The lower court's dismissal
was affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs/clients failed to
introduce expert testimony establishing the causal connection
between the attorney's allegedly negligent conduct and alleged
damages. The question was whether the foreseeable consequences
were so highly technical and specialized that an attorney was
needed to explain the transactions.97 Based on Wright, one au-
See Note, supra note 81, at 799.
278 So. 2d 890 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
See Note, supra note 30, at 425.
' Id. at 433.
' 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 199-200.
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
thor argues that in cases involving highly specialized types of
law, experts should be permitted to testify as to the legal effect
of the attorney's alleged misconduct. 98 If this type of case is so
highly technical that it should be an exception, it should be a
rare exception.
Another possible exception is where "the unresolved nature
of the law is relevant to show" that the defendant/attorney may
not have been negligent in the action he took or the advice he
gave. 99 In United States v. Garber,'°° the court permitted con-
flicting testimony from experts on the legal question of the tax
liability of the seller of a rare blood antibody.'0' The better
practice would be to allow only enough expert testimony about
the law to establish that the law was unsettled at the time of the
alleged malpractice. Testimony on the current law should be
excluded as an issue of law for the judge.
One author, while agreeing with the general rule excluding
expert testimony concerning the state of the law, argues that
"[w]hen the judge feels that the proffered expert testimony can
aid him in making his determination, he should allow the testi-
mony out of the hearing of the jury."' 0 2 This argument is
premised on the author's belief that when an expert "takes an
oath of truthfulness and thus may testify only to what he believes
is true," his legal arguments will be more impartial and of
greater assistance to the judge in interpreting the law.'0 3 There
is little reason to believe that a witness' oath gives any greater
guarantee of integrity or trustworthiness to legal argument than
the restraints on counsel imposed by the Canons of Ethics'04 or
the restraints imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 05
Remember Judge Learned Hand's observation, cited at the out-
set of this section, "[a]rgument is argument whether in the box
or at the bar, and its proper place is the last."'1t
" See Note, supra note 30, at 425.
United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1979).
,o 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
£0' Id. at 94-95.
,02 Note, supra note 81, at 805.
'" Id. at 806 (emphasis in original).
'm See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter CODE].
£05 See FED. R. Cirv. P. 11.
"" See note 78 supra.
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It is the judge's function, not the jury's, to interpret and
determine the law. "Allowing witnesses to testify as to questions
of law invites jury confusion and the possibility that the jury
will accept as law the witnesses' conclusion rather than the trial
judge's instructions.' 0 7
Kentucky follows the principle that jury instructions are "to
avoid abstract legal principles, presumptions, comments on the
weight of the evidence, and references to the burden of proof,
which is cast by the form of instruction."'' 0 The Kentucky
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he function of instructions ...
is only to state what the jury must believe from the evidence
... in order to return a verdict in favor of the party who bears
the burden of proof."' 9 The court further stated, in Rogers v.
Kasdan,"° "[t]he content of jury instructions on negligence should
be couched in terms of duty. They should not contain an abun-
dance of detail, but should provide only the bare bones of the
question for jury determination. This skeleton may then be
fleshed out by counsel on closing argument."'
H
This salutary principle places the duty on the court to deter-
mine the law and to incorporate it in the instructions by framing
the factual issues for the jury so that explanations of the law
are unnecessary. It follows that if avoiding explaining the law
in the instructions is a desirable goal, it is even more desirable
to avoid explaining the law from the witness stand through
experts. Such explanations can only confuse the jury and impair
its ability to decide disputed issues of fact. A party should prevail
by proof of facts that meet legal standards integrated into the
statement of the factual issue in the instructions, rather than by
retaining the more persuasive sounding expert witnesses. The
trend in Kentucky is to curtail the use of expert testimony,
intending to limit its use to where it assists the jury in determin-
ing the factual issues, rather than preempting the function of
People v. Lyons, 285 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
Whorton v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 627, 631-32 (Ky. 1978) (footnote
omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
" Webster v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1974) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070, reh'g denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975).
612 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1981).
" Id. at 136.
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the jury. 1 2 With these principles as a goal in framing instruc-
tions, no reason exists to adopt a different approach in legal
malpractice cases.
III. COUNTERSUITS
A. Judge vs. Jury Questions
In contrast to litigation negligence cases where a former client
charges negligence in the conduct of the prior litigation, "coun-
tersuits" are filed by a former defendant, typically a physician,
who was successful in the prior litigation and now claims dam-
ages for having been sued in a "groundless" law suit. 3 Starting
in the 1970's, in response to the growing number of suits filed
against physicians, the size of jury awards, and the cost of
malpractice insurance, physicians engaged in an organized effort
to pursue countersuits they considered to be meritorious." 4 While
these countersuits are almost universally labelled "malicious
prosecution" cases, because the claim is based on a prior civil
rather than criminal proceeding, the proper description is
"wrongful civil proceedings.'"
Viewed as "wrongful civil proceedings," countersuits for
malicious prosecution are intentional torts and require: (1) the
prior civil action must have terminated in the physician's favor;
and (2) the attorney prosecuting the prior action must have acted
without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than
securing proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceed-
ings are based." 6
Confusion arises in these suits because the tort is in transi-
tion. Its growth is stimulated by the efforts of a particular type
of defendant, the physician, to expand the parameters of the
traditional tort of wrongful civil proceedings to include those
"I- See, e.g., 474 S.W.2d at 347. See also 666 S.W.2d at 342.
See Reuter, Physician Countersuits: A Catch 22, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 203 (Winter
1980).
- Id. at 204 (The American Medical Association has provided assistance to phy-
sicians who countersue following malpractice actions.).
"' See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
116 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, § 120, at 889.
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medical malpractice suits physicians deem "frivolous" in na-
ture.'"7 The major areas of confusion include defining the mean-
ing of "probable cause" and deciding the roles of judge and
jury in determining lack of probable cause. The confusion is
everywhere," s but nowhere more evident than in the leading
Kentucky cases on the subject, Raine v. Drasin,"9 and its sequel,
Mahaffey v. McMahon. 20
The problems of defining the elements of probable cause
and deciding which facts establish the lack of probable cause in
these cases are confounded by indecision about whether its ex-
istence should be treated as a question of law or a question of
fact, and to what extent expert testimony should be permitted
to prove or disprove its existence. As with negligence actions
against attorneys by former clients, clarifying and applying the
law with consistency is directly related to separating the issues
to be decided by the court from those to be decided by the jury.
Why any particular issue should be decided as a question of
fact rather than a question of law involves considerations of
historical development, judicial efficiency, and the goals of ju-
dicial policy making. The policy should be, insofar as possible,
to provide clarity and certainty in a rule of law on the one hand
and individual justice on the other. Leon Green, instrumental in
the development of the Restatement of Torts, provided relevant
insight:
The distinctions between an evidentiary fact, ultimate fact,
material fact, conclusion of fact, and conclusion of law, are
utterly incomprehensible unless the purposes which the courts
are making them serve are first understood.'2'
See Reuter, supra note 113, at 204-05 (discussing "crisis committees" formed
by the State Medical Association to pursue countersuits they consider to be meritorious
and the American Medical Association (AMA) resolution favoring "appropriate assistance"
to physicians "who countersue following frivolous malpractice actions").
" See Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 82, at 125.
621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981), discussed at notes 180-187 and 193-204 infra and ac-
companying text.
1 1 630 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1982), discussed at notes 187-204 infra and accompanying
text.
1-1 L. GREEN, supra note 9, at 271 (emphasis added).
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The most important service which the terms "law" and
"fact" render to legal science is found in the allocation of the
functions of judge and jury in the trial of cases. . . . [B]y and
large the terms "law" and "fact" are merely short terms for the
respective functions of judge afid jury. And to discover these
functions no a priori understanding of "law" and "fact" is suf-
ficient.'22
To address properly the role of determining probable cause
in countersuits, one must first understand and recognize that the
line drawn in allocating questions of law and fact is judicial
policy making. This line should be drawn to best serve both the
rule of law and the ends of justice by promoting the clarity and
stability of the law while permitting the redress of those griev-
ances that a jury, representing the conscience of the community,
deems just. The range of potential liability is expanded by des-
ignating the interpretive function as fact-finding, leaving the
decision to the jury. The range is narrowed and stability provided
by designating it a question of law retained by the court.'2
In theory, every unsuccessful lawsuit has proved to be
groundless. Historically this, in itself, did not prove lack of
probable cause. Deciding the existence of probable cause began
with the criminal law and was a function allocated strictly to
the court, not the jury. While there may be underlying factual
questions regarding the attorney's conduct for the jury to decide,
the ultimate decision of whether there was probable cause should
remain a question of law. 24
Sometimes the evidence regarding the attorney's conduct is
conflicting, and the determination of whether the attorney lacked
probable cause in filing the prior lawsuit depends on which facts
are believed. The jury instructions should then be framed to
require the jury to decide the facts regarding the lawyer's con-
duct, but not the question of probable cause. Two recent Ken-
tucky cases, Raine v. Drasin25 and Mahaffey v. McMahon,126
I' Id. at 279.
'' See Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Ky. 1985)
(citing L. GREEN, supra note 9, at 385-91).
,'4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 675, comment c (1976).
12, 621 S.W.2d 895.
126 630 S.W.2d 68.
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which will be analyzed later in this Article, failed to properly
distinguish probable cause determination in malicious prosecu-
tion countersuits from determining negligence in malpractice
suits brought by a former client. In each case, the Kentucky
Supreme Court seemed prepared to allow the jury to decide
whether the evidence was sufficient to establish want of probable
cause and to permit expert testimony on what constitutes prob-
able cause.
Textbook law on probable cause in an action for wrongful
use of civil proceedings requires that the wrongdoer act both
"without probable cause" and "primarily for a purpose other
than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in
which the proceedings are based."' 2 7 The Restatement specifies
that in the breakdown between "functions of court and jury"
in actions charging wrongful civil proceedings, "the court deter-
mines whether ... (c) the defendant had probable cause for his
action," meaning a reasonable belief that his claim might be
held legally valid.' 28 "The jury determines . . . (b) whether the
defendant acted primarily for a purpose other than that of
securing the proper adjudication of the claim on which the
proceeding was based."' 29 This is the civil equivalent of the
requirement of malice in an action for malicious prosecution for
wrongful criminal proceedings. a0
The Restatement expresses a two-prong test for both mali-
cious prosecution and wrongful use of civil proceedings. The
first prong, the lack of probable cause, depends upon a reason-
able belief in the possibility that the claim is valid, an issue for
the court to decide.'' The second prong, an improper purpose,
which is for the jury to decide, arises only after the court has
determined a lack of probable cause, and requires finding malice
or wrongful purpose as that term applies to civil proceedings.'
32
If we consider a related tort, abuse of process, the meaning
of wrongful purpose becomes clear, because abuse of process
"2" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674-76 (1977).
,Z, Id. at § 681(b) (1977).
' Id. at § 681.
id. at § 673 (1977).
See id. at §§ 662, 675 (1977).
" See id. at §§ 660, 676 (1977).
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spells out that the proof must show the action was brought "to
accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed," such as
"spite" or some other "ulterior purpose."'' 3 3 The requirement
that "the defendant acted primarily for a purpose other than
that of securing a proper adjudication of the claim' '1 34 describes
a wrongful act similar in character. Thus the jury's function in
the countersuit is to find an element of wrongful purpose that
qualifies such a case as an intentional tort rather than as mere
negligence.
An extensive article by Stewart R. Reuter states the rule
generally applied as follows:
A malicious prosecution action will be unsuccessful unless the
physician can prove that the patient had no reason at all to
believe that malpractice might have occurred. "According to
the generally accepted view, probable cause depends not on
the actual state of the case in point of fact, but upon the
honest belief of the person instituting it. It may flow from a
belief that turns out to be unfounded as long as it is not
unreasonable." 35
Clearly, the pressure to move the elements of the tort of mali-
cious prosecution towards negligence to accommodate these
countersuits comes from physicians, hospitals and other health
care providers.'3 6 On the other hand, the American Bar Associ-
ation's position is that "[b] justification exists for a special
rule governing malicious prosecution actions brought by health
care providers against persons who sued them for malprac-
tice." 37
As background for the discussion on Kentucky law, three
cases addressing the problem are considered. The first, Kassan
v. Bledsoe,'3 8 is unusual in that it is a countersuit by a lawyer,
' Id. at § 682 (1977).
I' d. at §§ 674-76.
"' Reuter, supra note 113, at 221-22 (quoting Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d
637, 640 (D.C. 1978)).
,, See, e.g., id. at 203-07.
American Bar Association, Special Committee on Medical Professional Liability
Report to the House of Delegates (Jan. 1986).
' 60 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
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rather than a physician. Kassan was a lawyer joined as a defend-
ant with his client, Fraser, in the underlying case charging that
they were guilty of fraudulent real estate transactions. After the
case against Kassan was dismissed, he sued, claiming that naming
him in the fraud action was malicious prosecution. 39 The court
held that once the underlying facts relied upon to show lack of
probable cause for naming Kassan in the fraud action are estab-
lished, the existence of probable cause was "a question of law
for the court"'14 and affirmed the dismissal of the case stating:
[A]s it is applicable to the law of malicious prosecution, the
term 'probable cause' has been defined to be a suspicion
founded upon circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a
reasonable person in the belief that the charge is true.
.. And if it subsequently is determined that the position
honestly taken by the attorney was erroneous he should be
relieved from responsibility.'
4'
In another California case, Tool Research & Engineering
Corp. v. Henigson,'42 again dismissed by the trial court on the
ground that the facts did not prove lack of probable cause, the
court stated:
Resolution of the question of the existence of a triable issue
of fact on the question of probable cause requires the isolation
of the factual and legal elements of probable cause itself. The
trier of fact must resolve any conflict in the evidentiary un-
derpinning of the facts of probable cause. Once that conflict
has been resolved, the question of whether the facts as they
are found to exist constitute probable cause for bringing the
former action is a question of law to be resolved by the
judge. 
43
In Carroll v. Kalar," the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that a trial court was justified in concluding that the patient and
"' Id. at 800.
'" Id. at 803.
' Id.
120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
* Id. at 297.
545 P.2d 411 (Ariz. 1976).
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his attorney did not lack probable cause to bring a physician's
malpractice action, even though the case against the physician
was dismissed on summary judgment. The court stated:
Whether a given set of facts constitutes probable cause is
always a question of law to be determined by the court. The
only function of the jury is to determine what the actual facts
are if the facts are conflicting. If from one set of facts the
conclusion can be inferred that probable cause exists, and from
another that it does not, it is for the jury to determine the
true state of facts.1
45
In response to the countersuing physician's position that
"there was a jury question as to whether the [patient's lawyers']
'state of mind was such that they had probable cause for initi-
ating the lawsuit,' " the court stated:
[The physician] does not, however, point to any facts which
would indicate that [the lawyers] did not have an honest, actual
belief in [the physician's] guilt and from our reading of the
record we can find no facts which would support the belief
that there was a disputed question necessary to be resolved by
a jury.1
These cases represent the traditional, conservative view of
the treatment of "probable cause" in countersuits for malicious
prosecution. Probable cause has been historically treated as an
issue for the court to decide because it "began as a remedy for
unjustifiable criminal proceedings."' 47 Probable cause to issue a
criminal warrant has always been a question for the court to
decide.
B. The Use of Expert Witness Testimony in Countersuits
The proper use of expert testimony in a countersuit by a
prior adverse party for malicious prosecution is discussed in an
article by Breslin and McMonigle:
, Id. at 414-15.
I' d. at 415.
'4' PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, at § 120.
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In the malicious prosecution action against the attorney, the
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prior civil action
terminated in plaintiff's favor; (2) the attorney lacked probable
cause in prosecuting the action; and (3) the attorney acted
maliciously.
The first and third elements of a cause of action for
malicious prosecution are not issues appropriate for expert
testimony. The issue of whether the civil proceeding terminated
in plaintiff's favor is generally an issue of law to be decided by
the court upon argument of counsel. The issue of malice or "ill-
will" appears to be a question of fact within the general ex-
perience of jurors and therefore can be decided by the jury
without the assistance of expert testimony.' 8
Our basic premise is that the use of expert testimony should
follow the allocation of functions to judge and jury. Such tes-
timony addresses only those issues the jury must decide. To rule
appropriately on the admissibility of expert testimony, the trial
court must first understand which issues are for the judge and
which are for the jury. The Breslin and McMonigle analysis
reveals that when expert testimony is strictly limited to those
issues addressed to the jury's function, there is little, if any,
appropriate place for such testimony in countersuit cases. A
review of cases cited in the article confirms this. 149
In Carroll v. Kalar,50 the countersuing physician offered
expert testimony from two lawyers that the facts in the under-
lying case were not sufficient to support probable cause. The
appellate court disposed of this issue as follows:
But this is not a conflict in the facts of the case which must
be resolved by a jury. This is a conflict in personal opinions
as to the significance of the facts. At best it is no more than
a conflict between two attorneys and the trial judge as to
whether the facts show probable cause. Since it is the respon-
sibility of the trial judge to say whether the facts give rise to
probable cause, the expressions of opinions by others [attor-
neys giving expert testimony] are not relevant and are wholly
" Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 82, at 125 (footnotes omitted).
'" See id. at 125-27.
545 P.2d 411 (Ariz. 1976).
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immaterial to the decision in the case. The opinion of a lawyer
on the question of probable cause is not admissible.' 5'
Other jurisdictions reached the same conclusion as Carroll, without
so clearly articulating the basis for their conclusion.'52
However, the California appellate court took a somewhat
different approach in Weaver v. Superior Court,'53 holding that
if an attorney filed a groundless medical malpractice case with
no investigation because of an unreasonable belief that the stat-
ute of limitations was about to run, the jury could disbelieve
the attorney actually held such a belief and find as a fact that
he did not.'54 Thus the factual interpretation was held to be a
question for the jury. This approach followed an earlier Cali-
fornia case that held "the evidence bearing on the [probable
cause] question was in conflict, if only by drawing of reasonable
inferences, and [therefore] correctly left ... up to the jury."'' 5
Although the Weaver opinion does not address the use of expert
testimony, presumably if there is a factual conflict for the jury
to decide on the issue of probable cause raised by a "conflict"
in inferences, expert testimony would be permissible to assist the
jury in deciding what inference to draw.
The Breslin and McMonigle article concludes:
In summary, the case law is in conflict.... One view is that
the jury merely resolves any conflicts in the underlying
facts .... The court then determines whether the facts, as
found by the jury, constitute probable cause .... The other
view appears to leave both the question of the resolution of
conflicts in the underlying facts (what actually happened) and
the inferences to be drawn from these facts (existence or ab-
sence of probable cause) for the jury to decide.'1
6
1'5 Id. at 415.
152 See, e.g., Murdock v. Gerth, 150 P.2d 489, 493 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944);
Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 640 (D.C. 1978); Davis v. Williams, 379 N.E.2d
158, 159 (N.Y. 1978).
156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 755-59.
'- Davis v. Local Union, 94 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
' Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 82, at 128.
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C. Countersuit Conclusions
Reviewing the cases and literature, this author concludes that
the following reasons support a policy in favor of treating the ex-
istence of probable cause as a question of law for the court to decide
before submitting a countersuit claim to the jury:
(1) If probable cause is included among the issues for the jury
to decide, the jury's increased scope of decision making creates un-
predictability in results. The conflicting expert testimony that will
follow further increases uncertainty.
(2) As a threshold issue before jury adjudication, probable cause
offers a prospect for summary adjudication, which is both cost and
time efficient.
(3) The prospect of expanded attorney liability in countersuit
cases may deter attorneys from filing suit on behalf of a client in the
first instance, thus impairing access to the courts in cases which
might prove meritorious as well as in cases which prove groundless.
(4) In malicious prosecution cases the adversary sues the attor-
ney, as contrasted with negligence cases where usually the former
client, to whom the duty was owed, sues the attorney. The adver-
sary is clearly not the intended beneficiary of the attorney's services
and therefore need not possess the same ability to sue an attorney.
One might add to this already persuasive list the professional
obligations imposed upon attorneys by the American Bar Associ-
ation's (hereinafter "ABA") Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 5 provides, "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." 57 His professional
judgment "should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely
for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and
loyalties." 5 8 This obligation "requires that he disregard the desires
of others that might impair his free judgment."' 59
Canon 7 requires that "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
'" CODE Canon 5.
Id. EC 5-1.
Id. EC 5-21.
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Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.' '6 It is his duty "to
seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and
to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or de-
fense. ' ' 6' "While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve
in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law."' 62
The limitations on these obligations are explained by the
ethical limits imposed by the Code:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a
trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows
or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwar-
ranted under existing law, except.., if it can be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.... 163
With these Canons in mind, the policy of the law must favor
a restricted view of the evolution of countersuits as a new theory
of liability. Further, these Canons provide a sound basis for
framing instructions to the jury to enable it to decide the malice
or wrongful purpose issue arising after the judge has decided
the threshold probable cause question.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts' position' 64 is that it is
for the court to decide the existence of "probable cause," mean-
ing a reasonable belief in the possibility that the claim "may be
held legally valid upon adjudication."' 65 If the judge decides
there is no probable cause, then the jury should decide wrongful
purpose, meaning "a purpose other than that of securing the
proper adjudication of the claim."' 66 In the context of counter-
suits, malice, properly understood, may be inferred from an
I~' d. Canon 7.
Id. EC 7-1 (footnotes omitted).
Id. EC 7-3.
Id. DR 7-102 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674, 676 (1976).
Id. at § 675, comment e (1976).
Id. at § 676.
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improper purpose, not from lack of probable cause. The ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility provides the best guidelines
for deciding when an improper purpose can be inferred.
Thus, both the proper use of expert testimony and the proper
instructions for the jury follow from an appropriate division of
the function of judge and jury in the countersuit case.
D. Countersuits in Kentucky
The case that first interested this author in countersuits was
Lee v. Burroughs, 67 tried before me when I was a Judge in the
Jefferson Circuit Court. This was a physician's countersuit for
malicious prosecution dismissed on a directed verdict for the
defendant following trial.
68
In the underlying action, the patient's husband sued two
physicians charging that they performed a sterilization procedure
on his wife without his permission. The underlying medical
malpractice case had been dismissed because both a Kentucky
statute and a United States Supreme Court decision seemingly
mandated that a husband had no legal right to be consulted
before his wife was sterilized and that he had no property right
in his wife upon which to base a claim for medical malpractice
in the event she obtained sterilization without his consent.
69
Attorney Burroughs had proceeded, if not groundlessly, at
least mistakenly, as to the current state of the law, in the good
faith belief that his client had a legitimate cause of action against
the physicians. At the trial of the legal malpractice suit, I re-
fused to permit the physicians to introduce expert testimony
from a lawyer to the effect that the underlying suit was ground-
less and filed with lack of probable cause, holding that lack
of probable cause depended upon more than a mistaken belief
as to the state of the law, that it required proof that the ini-
tial action was filed either in bad faith or in the absence of a
good faith belief that there was a cause of action, and that there
1- Whitehead v. Burroughs, No. 230401 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Jan. 9, 1979), rev'd
sub nom, Lee v. Burroughs, No. 79-CA-S97-MR, 27 Ky. LAW SUMM. 11, 15 (Ky. Ct.
App. Aug. 15, 1980) (unpublished) [hereinafter cited as KLS].
No. 79-CA-897-MR, slip op. at 2.
No. 230401, transcript at 6-8. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.345 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984) [hereinafter KRS].
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was a distinction between negligence on the one hand and lack
of probable cause on the other. 70 Further, my opinion was that
in a suit for malicious prosecution based on a civil complaint
(rather than the filing of criminal charges), the law of damages
required proof of a special injury, such as physical detention or
at least interference with the lawful use of one's property.
7'
Ultimately, I was concerned that expanding the scope of mali-
cious prosecution would contravene public policy considerations
against limiting access to the courts; that broadening the scope
of malicious prosecution actions in such cases would mean that
almost every losing lawsuit could be turned into a countersuit
for malicious prosecution.
72
In my view, although the attorney owed his client the duty
of reasonable care and was bound to perform up to the standard
of practice of the profession, no such duty was owed to the
person sued.' 73 The opponent was owed honesty and good faith,
but not a duty of reasonable care, which implies some weighing
of interests.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that "the trial court was in error in determining that
probable cause existed as a matter of law in the original action
against appellants."' 74 Actually, my decision at the trial level
was not that probable cause existed but that the countersuing
physicians had failed to prove lack of probable cause.' 75 The
Court of Appeals' opinion takes note of the traditional rule that
the threshold question of probable cause is a decision for the
court, not the jury, 76 but then states that "malice, unlike prob-
able cause, is a question to be submitted to the jury,"'n and
that "this is an inference that the jury may or may not make in
110 No. 230401, transcript at 5, 9.
7 See, e.g., Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 86, 87-8 (Ky. 1951). See
also O'Toole v. Franklin, 569 P.2d 561, 564 n.3 (Or. 1977) (injury to the physician's
reputation is not the "special injury" required to impose liabilty for malicious prose-
cution).
,7 See No. 230401, transcript at 8-9.
See id., transcript at 5, 8-9.
No. 79-CA-879-MR, slip op. at 5.
No. 230401, transcript at 4.
,76 No. 79-CA-879-MR, slip op. at 3.
,71 Id., slip op. at 5.
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its discretion.' '1 78 The opinion does not address the question of
whether the trial court erred when it refused to permit expert
testimony on the subject of probable cause.
The holding in Lee v. Burroughs implies that failure to
research the legal premises underlying a client's claim proves
that the attorney filed a groundless claim, and in turn, that from
this evidence the jury can infer that the suit was filed with malice
and lack of probable cause. However, as an unpublished opin-
ion, it is not precedent in other cases.
179
Physicians' countersuits became a topic of major importance
in Kentucky following the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision
in Raine v. Drasin.Y8 0 In Raine, physicians who had been sued
for medical malpractice initiated a countersuit after a voluntary
dismissal of the underlying case. To show lack of probable cause
the physicians proved that the injury to the patient in the medical
malpractice case occurred before the two physicians bringing the
countersuit became involved in the patient's treatment. Accord-
ing to the court's opinion, the patient's attorneys, now defend-
ants, admitted they filed suit with "no evidence to implicate the
doctors."'' The underlying suit had included everyone involved
in the patient's treatment, and the reason for including physi-
cians employed only after the patient was injured is not explained
in the opinion.
In the countersuit, the physicians offered expert testimony
from a law professor to the effect that in filing the medical
malpractice suit the lawyers "did not comply with the standard
of care for ordinary and prudent lawyers."' 8 2 Although the
opinion does not reflect whether the expert witness also testified
directly to the lack of probable cause issue, it does show that
the issue of lack of probable cause was submitted to the jury
along with the issue of malice, in a confusing set of instruc-
tions." 3 Among the glaring shortcomings of the instructions, the
Id., slip op. at 5-6.
' See Ky. R. Cwv. P. 76.28(4)(c) (1986) [hereinafter CR]. See also Penco, Inc. v.
Detrex Chem. Indus., 672 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Jones v. Commonwealth,
593 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981).
Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 901.
"c' See id.
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
"probable cause" element was worded so that it put the burden
on the defendant/attorney to prove the existence of probable
cause, equated probable cause with "ordinary prudence," as-
signed liability if the prior suit against the physicians was instituted
"without probable cause and/or . . .maliciously" and stated
"malice ... could be inferred from a lack of probable cause."'' II
The jury awarded the physicians both compensatory and punitive
damages. '" The judgment was affirmed.'186
Thus expert testimony was used to prove the attorneys' "fail-
ure to comply with the standard of care" in filing the lawsuit,
from which the jury was permitted to infer "lack of probable
cause." Contrary to the Restatement, 87 lack of probable cause
was decided as an issue of fact for the jury rather than as an
issue of law, and, with obvious error, was treated as synonymous
with failure to exercise reasonable care.
The most recent Kentucky case is Mahaffey v. McMahon,
which is another physician's countersuit against the former pa-
tient's attorney after the medical malpractice case was dismissed
on summary judgment. The medical malpractice case had been
dismissed because no evidence was offered in support of the
claim that the doctor performed unnecessary surgery. 88 In the
legal malpractice action, the trial court dismissed the case be-
cause the patient, on advice of the defendant/attorney, invoked
the attorney/client privilege as to conversation underlying the
bringing of the previous medical malpractice case. 8 9
The trial court in the legal malpractice case refused to permit
the physician's expert witnesses to testify as to lack of probable
cause unless and until they were prepared "to testify that re-
gardless of what a client related to an attorney in contemplation
of the filing of a medical malpractice case it would be necessary
to have another doctor's opinion."'' tg The Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed, holding that where the claim was an unnecessary
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 899.
Id. at 903.
See notes 164-166 supra and accompanying text.
630 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Ky. 1982).
' Id.
Id. at 70.
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operation, it would be "highly unlikely" that the client's state-
ments to the attorney "would be sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment of probable cause in the absence of some expert testimony
to buttress the claim that the operation ... was an unnecessary
surgical procedure."' 9' The court stated that "[tihe two experts
proffered by movant should be permitted to testify from the
available facts as to the likelihood of probable cause here."' 92
Again, as in Raine, 93 the Kentucky Supreme Court treated
negligence and lack of probable cause as synonymous, and treated
both as fact questions for a jury to decide, departing from the
view stated in the Restatement.
94
In these cases, the statement that malice can be inferred from
lack of probable cause is incomplete. Malicious prosecution, mean-
ing a suit "initiated or continued primarily for a purpose other than
that of securing a proper adjudication of the claim on which [it is]
based," ' 995 is an element of a countersuit for wrongful civil
proceedings in addition to lack of probable cause, not synon-
omous with it. Although a groundless suit, even in the sense
that there is no possibility of recovery, is some evidence to
establish malice, it should not be enough in itself.
The threshold for finding malice should be the same as the
threshold for awarding punitive damages. For malice to be im-
plied from conduct, the conduct should be outrageous. 96 Malice
may be implied, and need not be expressed "so long as the
conduct is sufficient to evidence conscious wrongdoing."'
97
The definition of malice used in Raine made it the equivalent
of lack of probable cause. 98 It omitted the element of "outra-
geous conduct ... sufficient to evidence conscious wrongdo-
ing." This is the criteria for malice which should be submitted
to the jury in the instructions in a countersuit case. Further, the
Id.
Id.
See note 180 supra.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681B (1977).
Id. at § 676 (1976).
' See, e.g., Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Ky.
1985).
Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1984) (emphasis added).
621 S.W.2d at 895. See notes 180-186 supra and accompanying text.
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instructions should be framed to put the burden of proving this
on the plaintiff who charges the attorney with malicious prose-
cution. 199
Thus, our current Kentucky cases fail to provide a clear
definition for probable cause, fail to allocate the functions of
judge and jury in the decision making process, and fail to set
appropriate guidelines for the use of expert testimony.
The Kentucky cases decided thus far seem to move from
evidence justifying a conclusion that the suit was "groundless"
(lacks factual or legal underpinning), to the conclusion that this
fact standing alone justifies a finding that the claim is unrea-
sonable, to the conclusion that this is lack of probable cause
necessary to sustain a charge of malicious prosecution, to the
ultimate conclusion that malice may be inferred from lack of
probable cause. No new evidence is required to proceed from
the proof that the suit was groundless to the conclusion that
there was both lack of probable cause and malice. Under this
approach, whenever the trier of fact believes the original suit
was groundless, the lawyer is subject to liability for malicious
prosecution.
This is a poor concept for the law. It disregards longstanding
public policy in favor of permitting access to the courts. In
effect, it creates a new right, the right to be free from suit,
endowing this new right with even greater dignity than was
formerly reserved for the right to be free from arrest on a
criminal charge.
Earlier this article discussed Kentucky's so-called "bare
bones" approach to jury instructions. 2°° Palmore's Kentucky
Instructions to Juries, states:
The basic function of instructions in Kentucky is to tell the
jury what it must believe from the evidence in order to resolve
each dispositive factual issue in favor of the party who bears
the burden of proof on that issue. In other jurisdictions, as at
common law, it may be appropriate to say that the purpose
of instructions is to advise the jury on the law of the case, but
not in this state.20'
I" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681A (1977).
2" See notes 108-111 supra and accompanying text.
' J. PALMORE, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 13.01 (1977).
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A corollary to this approach, appropriate for use in coun-
tersuits, is the Kentucky treatment afforded issues of intervening
cause in negligence and products liability cases. 2°2 In Kentucky,
when intervening cause is offered as a defense, the question of
whether a given set of facts, if true, would constitute a supersed-
ing intervening cause is treated as a "legal issue," and a thresh-
old question for the court to resolve:
Only when (1) an act which is claimed to have taken place
would be a superseding cause as a matter of law, and (2) there
is an issue of fact as to whether it happened, should there be
an instruction mentioning it and that instruction should tell
the jury in substance that unless it believes from the evidence
that it did not happen it should find for the defendant.
203
Transposing this approach to the issue of probable cause in
a countersuit, the jury should not be involved in deciding lack
of probable cause unless there is a factual conflict to be resolved,
raised by a conflict in the evidence regarding the circumstances
underlying the initiation or continuance of the prior case. If
such a conflict exists, the instructions should be worded to
require the jury to find the existence of probable cause unless
the jury finds the factual circumstances exist which the court
deems sufficient to prove lack of probable cause.
Thus, the court decides whether there is a lack of probable
cause and the jury is involved in this decision only when there
is a dispute in the facts alleged to prove lack of probable cause.
The primary question for the jury occurs only after a judicial
determination that the facts prove lack of probable cause. The
question is whether the proof shows that the suit against the defend-
ant in the prior case was initiated or continued primarily for a
wrongful purpose. A wrongful purpose is established by proof that
the attorney acted willfully and maliciously, or with such wanton
and reckless disregard for the harm it would cause the defendant
"-" See, e.g., House v. Kellerman, 519 S.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Ky. 1974) (negligence);
Montgomery Elevator v. McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Ky. 1984) (products lia-
bility).
101 519 S.W.2d at 383 (emphasis in original and supplied, respectively).
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as to indicate conscious wrongdoing. The kind of misconduct
that implies malice is a lawyer's violation of the code of profes-
sional ethics, not ordinary negligence. This approach closely
parallels the Restatement .
2 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have exhibited considerable confusion and inconsis-
tency in the treatment of attorneys' malpractice cases involving
charges of negligence by a former client or countersuits by a
former adversary. The solution to this confusion and inconsis-
tency lies in properly parsing the cases, separating those issues
that the court decides from those the jury decides. Appellate
decisions should squarely address the line of demarcation be-
tween the functions of court and jury, providing guidelines as
follows:
A. Litigation Negligence Cases
1) It is a judicial function to decide the legal conse-
quences of attorney's negligence in the handling of prior litiga-
tion when the question is:
a) What would have been the legal consequences of
proper conduct by the attorney?
b) What would have been an appropriate ruling by a
judge in the prior case?
The argument of counsel, not expert testimony from the
witness stand, is the proper way to address the decision of these
judicial questions.
2) It is for the jury to decide:
a) Whether the attorney has been proved negligent in
the handling of the prior case;
b) Assuming negligence is proved, those factual ques-
tions which would have been addressed by the jury in the prior
case had the case been properly tried.
- See notes 130-134 supra and accompanying text. Section 673 relates to malicious
prosecution actions, but is adopted as applicable to actions for wrongful civil proceedings
by comment a to § 681b.
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Expert testimony addressing the issue of the attorney's neg-
ligence is appropriate to assist the jury in deciding whether the
attorney was negligent in the prior case, unless the facts speak
for themselves.
The better rule is to permit the second jury which is trying
the attorney's negligence case to decide any unresolved fact
questions in the underlying case as a matter of first impression
and without the assistance of expert testimony. It is neither
practical nor feasible for the jury trying the second case to
speculate on what the jury trying the first case would have done
had the attorney performed properly.
B. Countersuits by a Former Adversary
Based on sound reasons of judicial policy and historical
development, these former advocate countersuit cases should be
approached from a different perspective than negligence cases
brought by a former client. Countersuit cases should retain the
traditional elements of a cause of action for wrongful civil pro-
ceedings, as discussed and analyzed in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. A bright line distinction should be drawn between
countersuit cases and negligence cases. Probable cause should con-
tinue to be treated as a legal issue for the court to decide; not, like
negligence, a factual issue for the jury to decide.
In countersuits, the trial court should decide whether the
attorney lacked probable cause to initiate or continue the un-
derlying action as a question of law and as a threshold issue.
Countersuits should be submitted to the jury only after the judge
has made the decision that the attorney lacked probable cause
as that term is defined in the Restatement. If the court decides
that the existence of probable cause turns on a conflict in the
facts, that issue should be framed for the jury by an instruction
that lets the jury decide the facts, while reserving the ultimate
question of lack of probable cause for the court. In either event,
probable cause should be a preliminary issue.
The principle issue for the jury arises only after a decision
that the attorney lacked probable cause. Then it is for the jury
to decide the further questions of whether the proof shows that
the attorney acted to accomplish a wrongful purpose, and, if
so, the appropriate damages.
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